Comments
Andrew on May 8th, 2008 at 1:05 pm #
Actually, ‘ISO 400′ messages (ie 04×0 messages used in ISO 8583, and other standards such as AS2805) are reversals. These messages are used to ‘cancel’ a financial advise message (02×0) that has been previously sent, but for some reason is in an unknown state. This is usually used when there is a communications error. The use of track data in ISO 8583 04×0 messages is not required.
David Bergert on May 9th, 2008 at 5:09 am #
I would agree that it should not be required - but on an issuer implementation we were receiving reversals from a processor (which typically use a SAF mechanism), until this recent change. So it really depends on the endpoints/interface specs
Bruce Sussman on May 10th, 2008 at 5:38 pm #
I would suggest a somewhat different view about store and forward transactions. Store and forward are part of the authorization cycle because they emanate from a failed authorization attempt or “ISO 200″ message.The merchant’s purchase authorization (200 message) did not reach the card network or issuer (most often due to connectivity or application problems). Rather than lose the txn, the merchant willfully stores the card data and re submits it later on. I would suggest that card data retained under store and forward rightfully be considered as part of the DSS - hopefully, the next version of the DSS will make this clear. Also, under ANSI and ISO standards for pin security, it is not permissible to retain pin blocks. So proceed with extreme caution if you support store and forward
Ben d'Anvers on May 15th, 2008 at 2:32 am #
I’d just like to clarify further on Michael’s article: The scope of protecting data (a la requirement 3.4) is not restricted only to cardholder data post-auth. It applies to ALL stored cardholder data regardless of whether the TX has been authorised or not. This is not a recommendation as he suggests, it IS a PCI DSS requirement. Pre (Op regs)& post auth (PCI DSS) issues are only applicable to requirement 3.2.x, not to requirement 3.4 Post a comment
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